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COMMENT
SWAPPED DISINCENTIVES:
WILL CLEARINGHOUSES MITIGATE
THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE’S SWAP EXEMPTIONS?
Timothy P.W. Sullivan*
The Bankruptcy Code contains exemptions for swap agreements that
allow creditors to seize collateral, to terminate their contract, and to net
obligations once the debtor files for bankruptcy. By privileging this class of
creditors, these provisions reduce incentives to monitor counterparty risk,
and thus magnified losses experienced during the recent financial crisis.
Congress overlooked this role of the Bankruptcy Code in destabilizing the
financial system. Instead, its response was to require that all swaps be
traded through a clearinghouse. This failure to address one of the
contributing factors to the swap market’s collapse should be worrisome, as
a clearinghouse’s traditional risk management devices likely cannot
prevent a similar crisis in the future. Nonetheless, under the proper
conditions, a clearinghouse theoretically has greater incentives to monitor
counterparty risk than its individual members, thereby strengthening
market discipline and financial stability. In order to realize this incentive
structure, certain regulatory measures are necessary, namely heightened
disclosure requirements and strict governance rules designed to preserve
the independence of the clearinghouse’s board from its members.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1997, credit default swaps (CDSs) were still relatively exotic financial
instruments, trading at a volume of around $180 billion. 1 The next decade
saw an explosion in their use, with approximately $34.422 trillion trading in
2006, and $62.173 trillion in 2007. 2 Many lauded this development, both
as “a major advance in risk management for all financial intermediaries,”
and for providing “a market-based reading of the risks of companies that is
not available from any other source and that can be of major assistance to
regulators, as well as investors and creditors.” 3
This growth was accompanied by a privileged status in the Bankruptcy
Code (Code), as Congress believed it necessary to contain systemic risk in
the event of a large institution’s insolvency. Its reasoning, eventually
applied to all swap agreements, was fairly straightforward: rather than
waiting for a lengthy bankruptcy proceeding to share assets with other
creditors, a cash-strapped swap party could now immediately seize
collateral and terminate its contract with the debtor. 4 By permitting these
actions, privileged status would help to maintain liquidity precisely when
the financial system needed it most. 5 However, this systemic elixir came
packaged with an unforeseen side effect: because creditors became more
concerned with the debtor’s ability to post collateral than to repay the
underlying debt, these provisions ultimately reduced private market
1. Mike Jakola, Credit Default Swap Index Options: Evaluating the Viability of a New
Product for the CBOE, FIN. INSTS. & MKT. RESEARCH CTR., KELLOGG SCH. OF MGMT. 3
(June 2, 2006), http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fimrc/papers/jakola.pdf.
2. ISDA Market Survey, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N (2010),
http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-annual-data.pdf.
3. Peter J. Wallison, Everything You Wanted to Know About Credit Default Swaps—
But Were Never Told, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH 10 (Dec. 2008),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090107_12DecFSOg.pdf.
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See infra Part II.C.
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incentives to monitor counterparty risk. 6 In response to the perceived
security of these contracts, one financial analyst noted that “[d]ue to these
credit enhancements, market participants commonly view interest rate
swaps as free of counterparty default risk.” 7
This distortion to market discipline lay dormant until 2008, when Bear
Stearns—with nearly a quarter of its assets subject to the Code’s privileged
status—suffered a bank run. 8 AIG Financial Products (AIG), with $400
billion in credit default swap exposure and a mere $100 billion in equity,
required a federal bailout not long thereafter.9 In a recent article, Professor
Mark J. Roe argues that if the Code’s priority treatment of these instruments
had been narrower, these firms would have been “less financially central
and less interconnected. They would likely have had less super-priority
debt. The financial system would have been more resilient.” 10 As the dust
from the credit crisis begins to settle, these provisions of the Code
exempting swaps from the normal rules of bankruptcy appear to be an
important yet overlooked culprit in destabilizing the financial system.
Despite their loss-magnifying effects, these exemptions were not
addressed in the recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act 11 (Dodd-Frank). Instead, Congress’s response was to
require that all swaps be guaranteed by clearinghouses.12 The so-called
“clearing mandate” came to be regarded as one of Dodd-Frank’s “most
notable provisions affecting the OTC derivatives market,” 13 and even
considered by some to be its “biggest win of all.” 14 But will Congress’s
decision to opt for the clearing mandate instead of limiting the Code’s
exemptions merely shift these disincentives from banks to clearinghouses?
Or is there something inherent in the structure of a clearinghouse which can
induce more diligent assessment of counterparty risk? And if the answer to
this latter question is “yes,” are there specific regulatory oversights
necessary to preserve that integrity?
This Comment seeks to address each of these questions. To be certain, it
may be optimal to limit particular swap exemptions and thereby target the
root cause of these disincentives, as some scholars have advocated.
However, it is important to survey the capacity of clearinghouses to bolster
market discipline in the event that Congress either fails to or delays in
addressing that issue. This is especially true because, having recently
6. See infra Part II.D.
7. Michael Johannes & Suresh Sundaresan, The Impact of Collateralization on Swap
Rates, 62 J. FIN. 383, 383 (2007).
8. Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Players’ Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis
Accelerator 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 552 (2011).
9. Id. at 550; see infra notes 52–55 and accompany text.
10. Id. at 542.
11. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
12. See id. § 723(a), 124 Stat. at 1675–81.
13. David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation,
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2010, 9:15 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-frank-financialregulation-legislation/.
14. Matt Taibbi, Wall Street’s Big Win, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 6, 2010, at 57.
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passed Dodd-Frank, Congress may lack a political constituency for reform
until the next crisis event.15
Part I provides a necessary background for understanding the issues at
hand. It begins by orienting the reader with a brief explanation of
derivatives. Next, it discusses swaps—a particular class of derivatives not
only at the heart of the recent financial crisis, but also subject to certain
exemptions from the Bankruptcy Code’s normal rules. Finally, it provides
a primer on the business of clearing, and discusses Congress’s theoretical
justifications for the clearing mandate as a response to the recent failure of
the swap market.
Part II introduces the Code’s exemptions for swaps, and the role they
played in the recent financial crisis. It begins by exploring the central
justification for the Code, and three bedrock rules which further that
justification. It then outlines in detail each of the provisions which exempt
swaps from these principles of bankruptcy law. Next, it discusses
Congress’s justifications for passing these exemptions. Finally, it explains
how these provisions reduce market discipline by weakening incentives to
hedge against counterparty risk.
Part III explores how a clearinghouse might strengthen market discipline,
and thus restore stability to the swap market. It begins by explaining which
basic elements of a clearinghouse, and similarly those often extolled by
commentators, are not capable of preventing a future AIG-type failure. It
then focuses on how a clearinghouse would theoretically have greater
incentives to monitor counterparty risk than its individual members.
Finally, building upon this framework, it highlights several key issues that
regulators should focus on to ensure that clearinghouses do in fact engage
in more rigorous market discipline.
I. THE BASICS OF BILATERAL AND CLEARED SWAP MARKETS
This part presents a financial and historical context for the legal issues
discussed later in this Comment. It begins by providing a background in
the financial instruments that are generally subject to the Code’s
exemptions, as well as the clearing mandate. In particular, it describes each
class of instruments and outlines their uses in the financial system.
Additionally, this section places its emphasis on one particular type of
swap—the credit default swap—because of its central role in the financial
crisis. Finally, it discusses the clearing mandate as a direct policy response
to the failure of the swap market.
A. What Is a Derivative?
Stated in the most abstract terms, a derivative is a financial agreement
with an economic value dictated by a specified variable, 16 sometimes
15. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
16. See Bernard J. Karol, Regulation of Financial Derivatives: An Overview of
Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 195, 195 (1995) (defining
derivatives as “contracts or securities whose values depend on (or ‘derive’ from) the prices
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referred to as the “underlying.” 17 Other important features include the
notional amount and the outstanding notional amount. The notional amount
refers to the number of units of “underlying” specified in the contract.18
The outstanding notional amount is the “notional amount multiplied by the
contract price per unit of underlying.” 19
To illustrate, consider the following example of a derivative with which
many readers may be familiar: an options contract. 20 A, the purchaser of
the option, pays a specified amount to B, the seller, in consideration for the
right (but not obligation) to buy five pounds of hops at $100 per pound.
Here, the notional amount is five, the contract price per unit of underlying is
$100, and the outstanding notional amount is $500. It is important to see
how the value of this option will be “derived” from the current market price
of hops (the variable). Consider that the option will only be valuable to A if
the current market price of hops is higher than $100 per pound. In that
case, A will exercise its option and purchase the hops from B for less than it
would have paid on the open market. If, however, the price of hops is
below $100 per pound, then the option is worthless to A.
Why might A enter into such an agreement? Derivatives can be used for
two essential purposes: hedging against risk and speculating. 21 To
illustrate, let us continue with the example of an options contract. Assume
that A is a small, local brewer. Because a principal ingredient in beer is
hops, 22 brewers are particularly sensitive to changes in their market price.
A spike in their price, perhaps owing to a drought in areas where hops are
grown (as occurred in 2007 23), could therefore lead to disastrous
consequences for brewers without financial protection. 24 A could insure
against this risk by entering into an options contract with B, a hops
producer, giving A the right to purchase a certain quantity at a fixed price.
A has now insulated himself from price fluctuations by shifting that risk to
B. 25

of underlying assets”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, § 610(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 1612 (defining a derivative as “any transaction that . . . is
based, in whole or in part, on the value of, any interest in, or any quantitative measure or the
occurrence of any event relating to, one or more commodities, securities, currencies, interest
or other rates, indices, or other assets”).
17. See Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 681. Feder notes that “[u]nderlyings can be anything that
interests markets: cash instruments, like stocks and bonds; tangibles, like commodities; or
intangibles, like interest rates, currency rates, stock market indices, and credit quality.” Id.
18. See id. at 683.
19. Id. at 683–84.
20. See Karol, supra note 16, at 195 (defining an “option”).
21. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 123, 125 (2010).
22. Tom Bowers, Trouble Brewing: Price of Hops Hits Home, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW
(Jan. 9, 2008), http://www.spokesmanreview.com/tools/story_pf.asp?ID=226938.
23. Id. (noting a resultant six-fold increase in the price of hops, in some instances).
24. Id. (predicting the failure of small, local brewers).
25. Feder, supra note 17, at 683 (“Importantly, derivatives do not eliminate underlying
risk; they only reposition it.”).
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However, this simple options contract could also be used by A to
speculate on the price of hops. 26 Assume that A, now a speculator, has a
gut feeling that the Hallertau region of Bavaria27 will soon experience
uncharacteristically low rainfall. In order to capitalize on this prescience, it
might purchase an option from B, a hops grower. When the drought does in
fact come, there will be a shortage of hops, driving up the price. A can now
exercise its option and resell those hops in the market for a large windfall.
Moreover, if A believed that there would be a robust growing season and a
consequent surplus of hops, it could have also speculated by selling options.
Assuming A was right and the price did fall below that fixed in the contract,
then the option would expire unexercised and A would walk away with a
profit from the sale of the option. Thus, parties are capable of speculating
on both sides of the transaction. 28
B. What Is a Swap?
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association defines a “swap” as
“[a] derivative where two counterparties exchange streams of cashflows
with each other. These streams are known as the legs of the swap and are
calculated by reference to a notional amount.”29 This definition will
become clearer after reviewing the five most important types of swap
agreements below.
Interest rate swaps allow a party to exchange variable interest rate
payments for fixed interest rate payments. 30 Why would a company enter
into such an agreement? Norman Feder explains its benefits as follows:
Company A owes $10 million at a floating rate of interest—LIBOR plus
1%—and would like to rearrange its obligation to a fixed rate to give it
greater predictability. The company can swap its payment obligations
with Bank B. Company A will periodically pay to Bank B a fixed rate of
interest—11%—on a notional amount of $10 million, and Bank B will
pay to Company A on the same schedule the periodic payments of LIBOR
plus 1% on the same notional amount . . . . This neutralizes Company A’s
market risk in LIBO rates. If Bank B lends money at floating interest
rates, the transaction ensures an interest rate spread between what the
bank pays and what it obtains. 31

Thus, Bank A gets greater predictability in the form of a fixed rate liability,
and Bank B gets a premium for taking on a variable interest rate. This will
26. A speculator buys or sells something so as to profit off of changes in its price, rather
than to insure against an underlying risk. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1529 (9th ed.
2009).
27. The Hallertau region of Bavaria is a famous region for growing hops. See MICHAEL
JACKSON, ULTIMATE BEER 15 (1998).
28. The practical difference is that the seller is taking a short position on the underlying
variable (he is betting that prices will fall), whereas the buyer is taking a long position (he is
betting that prices will increase).
29. Glossary, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www2.isda.org/functionalareas/research/Glossary (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
30. See Karol, supra note 16, at 200.
31. Feder, supra note 17, at 702–03.
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be a particularly important risk management tool for Bank A if, like many
banks, it has fixed rate assets: the swap allows it to shield itself from the
risk that the interest rate on its liabilities will increase, eventually exceeding
that of its assets. 32 With $364.378 trillion in notional amount outstanding
as of the second half of 2010, interest rate swaps are by far the most
significant type of swap. 33
A currency swap is an “agreement to swap specified payment obligations
denominated in one currency for specified payment obligations
denominated in a different currency.” 34 This allows parties to secure a
steady flow of money in a desired currency, mitigating currency risk arising
out of volatile foreign exchange markets. Ruth W. Ainslie explains a
common use of these instruments:
A very typical situation is a U.S. corporation that has a subsidiary in
Europe and has revenues from Europe. The corporation is going to have
Euro cash flow coming in. Now, in the United States, it has to pay its
bondholders, and servicing its bondholders is always going to be in
dollars. So the corporation will swap those European revenues with a
swap counterparty, and get dollars. The dollars then go to the bondholders
and the corporation has matched those risks. 35

If the U.S. corporation had not done so and the euro subsequently collapsed,
then income from its subsidiary would buy far fewer dollars on a foreign
exchange market. It could therefore find itself struggling to pay off its
dollar denominated debt. In the second half of 2010, currency swaps had
$19.271 trillion in notional amount outstanding. 36
Commodity swaps involve the exchange of a fixed payment for a
payment based upon the market price of a commodity. 37 This enables both
purchasers and sellers of goods to eliminate the risk of price volatility. To
illustrate, let us return to our hypothetical brewer. In order to hedge against
the risk of an increase in the price of hops, he can agree to pay a bank a
fixed amount, in return for the market price of hops multiplied by the
notional amount. He can then use these payments to purchase the amount
needed to meet production. As of the second half of 2010, there were
$1.781 trillion notional amount outstanding in commodity forwards and
swaps. 38
Equity swaps involve the exchange of a payment based upon a specified
equity index, share, or basket of shares, for either another payment based

32. See Wallison, supra note 3, at 4.
33. OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the Second Half of 2010, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS 8 (2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1105.pdf [hereinafter BIS Report].
34. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 1585.
35. Ruth W. Ainslie, Industry Perspective, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 14, 15–16
(2000).
36. See BIS Report, supra note 33, at 8.
37. Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The Inadequacies of
Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 379, 386 (1999).
38. See BIS Report, supra note 33, at 8.

1498

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

upon equity prices, or a payment based upon a fixed notional amount.39
This allows parties to hedge against the risk of equity price volatility. At
the end of 2010, equity-linked forwards and swaps constituted $1.828
trillion in notional amount outstanding. 40
A credit default swap “is nothing more than a contract in which one party
(the protection seller) agrees to reimburse another party (the protection
buyer) against a default on a financial obligation by a third party (the
reference entity).” 41 Thus, the protection buyer has effectively purchased
“insurance” against the risk of default on that obligation.42 Because the
issuer of protection is now legally obligated to pay its counterparty for loss
on the underlying financial obligation, it may itself wish to purchase
protection for all or a part of the notional amount it insured. It can do so by
entering into another CDS with a different party, making the original issuer
the new protection buyer. The new protection seller may in turn wish to
insure himself, and so on. In this scenario, risks of default can be
transferred and spread across many different parties, a process known in
financial jargon as a “daisy chain.” 43 As of the end of 2010, there were
$29.898 trillion notional amount outstanding in credit default swaps,
making them second only to interest rate swaps in terms of volume. 44
By operation of the CDS daisy chain, multiple financial institutions are
able to mutually reduce their credit risks via diversification. 45 Peter J.
Wallison illustrates by using the example of a bank which has made a
corporate loan to an oil manufacturer. A drop in oil prices may reduce the
creditworthiness of the manufacturer, increasing the risk of default. In
order to hedge against this risk, the bank would prefer exposure to assets
with either uncorrelated or negatively correlated risks (as the risk of one
increases, the risk of the other either is unaffected or decreases,
respectively). The bank can do so via a two-step process. First, it can
purchase protection on the corporate loan from a CDS dealer, who in turn
seeks protection from an insurance company. An insurance company is an
ideal choice, as exposure to the oil industry could provide much-needed
diversification to its primarily commercial real estate-based portfolio. Next,
the original bank issues CDS protection to a hedge fund on a loan made to
auto dealers, a negatively correlated risk to the oil industry. 46 As a result of
this series of CDS transactions, both the bank and the insurance company
have balanced their portfolios and decreased their own credit risk. Thus,
CDSs can be an extraordinarily valuable risk management tool. 47
39. See Feder, supra note 17, at 706.
40. See BIS Report, supra note 33, at 8.
41. See Wallison, supra note 3, at 3. Thus, the performance of the financial obligation is
the underlying variable from which the value of the CDS is derived.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See BIS Report, supra note 33, at 8.
45. See Wallison, supra note 3, at 6.
46. As oil becomes more expensive, demand for cars decreases, and vice versa.
47. In addition to this hedging function, CDSs are frequently used for speculation—just
like any other derivative. Michael Greenberger, Out of the Black Hole: Regulatory Reform
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It is helpful briefly to highlight how these CDS transactions are
structured. As Wallison notes, “The CDS market is a dealer market, so
transactions take place through dealers, over the counter rather than on an
exchange.” 48 Thus, derivatives are negotiated bilaterally in accordance
with parties’ particular needs, as opposed to on an exchange, which requires
a much higher degree of standardization.49 The seller of protection is
typically required to post collateral to secure its performance.50
Additionally, the contract will often contain a provision which requires the
posting of additional collateral if a materially adverse event should occur,
such as a decline in the credit rating of the reference entity, or the
counterparty to the CDS agreement itself.51 The price of the CDS is
dictated by the creditworthiness of the underlying reference entity. 52 If the
risk of default increases, then sellers of protection will demand higher
premium payments—known as the CDS’s spread—to compensate for this
additional risk. 53 If the risk of default decreases, then buyers can bargain
for a lower cost of protection.
CDSs were a principal device for insuring investments in the subprime
mortgage market. 54 Although the securitization process is beyond the
scope of this Comment, it will suffice to note that the process worked by
offering protection on mortgage-backed securities, which were in turn
secured by home mortgages. 55 From the perspective of issuers of

of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, ROOSEVELT INST. 101 (2009),
http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/OTC%20Derivatives.pdf. To illustrate, in
2008 three in every four CDSs were “naked,” that is, not insuring against the default of an
underlying loan owned by a party to the swap agreement. See id. This practice would have
been illegal under state insurance law as insuring someone else’s risk. See id.
48. Wallison, supra note 3, at 3. Precisely why these transactions have tended to take
place over-the-counter (OTC) rather than on an exchange is a fascinating question. See, e.g.,
Karol, supra note 16, at 199 (listing the primary benefits of OTC products as providing
confidentiality, avoiding position limits and margin requirements, and allowing for
customization); Wallace C. Turbeville, Derivatives Clearinghouses in the Era of Financial
Reform, ROOSEVELT INST., 8 (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/
wallace_clearinghouse.pdf (noting that financial institutions can utilize a line of credit in lieu
of collateral, which is “much more lucrative than straightforward corporate lending,” and
that the line of credit is not reported in the same manner as direct lending, and thus end
users’ balance sheets appear more healthy). Prior to the enactment of the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), some types of
derivatives were required to be traded on exchanges overseen by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission. See Greenberger, supra note 47, at 99–100.
49. See Karol, supra note 16, at 199.
50. Wallison, supra note 3, at 3. Under certain circumstances, buyers of protection may
also have to post collateral to ensure they continue to make premium payments. Id.
51. Id. at 3, 7.
52. See id.
53. See VIRAL ACHARYA ET AL., RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A
FAILED SYSTEM (2009). When the creditworthiness of the reference entity changes after the
CDS has been executed, one of the parties will be getting a windfall, known as being “in the
money”; if the creditworthiness increases, then the buyer is paying more for protection than
he could purchase on the open market, known as being “out of the money.” See Wallison,
supra note 3, at 3.
54. See Greenberger, supra note 47, at 100.
55. See id.
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protection such as AIG, CDSs were viewed as a cheap source of additional
revenue, with little to no risk of payouts. 56 This business model proved to
be catastrophically misplaced as the real estate market collapsed in 2007.
In September 2008, AIG’s credit rating was downgraded due to its large
CDS exposure, triggering concerns over the insurer’s creditworthiness.57
As a response, counterparties began demanding collateral en masse as CDS
spreads sky-rocketed. 58 Eventually, AIG was no longer able to meet these
collateral calls, prompting an $85 billion government bailout shortly
thereafter. 59 This sequence of events was a primary factor in motivating
Congress to require all swaps to be cleared as part of Dodd-Frank. 60 The
next section discusses the function of clearing and precisely why its
proponents believe so strongly that it might prevent a similar collapse in the
future.
C. The Business of Clearing
The essential purpose of a clearinghouse is to shield its members from
counterparty risk. 61 Clearinghouses enter into bilateral contracts with the
parties on both sides of a swap transaction, acting as a “middleman” who
buys the financial product from one party and sells it to another.
Consequently, the clearinghouse itself bears the costs of a party’s default,
rather than its members.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that this organization does not
eliminate any risk per se.62 On the contrary, “[f]rom the perspective of
market participants, the credit risk of the [clearinghouse] is substituted for
the credit risk of the other participants.” 63 A clearinghouse, just like an
individual firm in a bilateral transaction, might be managed poorly or
experience a series of unfortunate events, causing it to become insolvent
and default on its obligations. But if the structure of a clearinghouse does
not itself eliminate any risk, then why do its proponents favor it?

56. See id. at 101.
57. AIG Hit with Downgrades to Debt Ratings, CBS NEWS (Sept. 16, 2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/16/business/main4452015.shtml.
58. U.S. Announces $85 Billion Bailout of AIG, CBS NEWS (Sept. 16, 2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/16/business/main4453942.shtml.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 2, at 29–31 (2010) (discussing AIG’s failure as a
basis for the clearing mandate).
61. Kirsi Ripatti, Central Counterparty Clearing: Constructing a Framework for
Evaluation of Risks and Benefits 9 (Bank of Finland Discussion Papers, Dec. 30, 2004),
available at http://129.3.20.41/eps/fin/papers/0508/0508021.pdf.
62. Turbeville, supra note 48, at 2 (“The first thing to know about clearing is that it does
not eliminate any risk. In fact, it concentrates the credit risk inherent in derivatives
transactions.” (emphasis added)).
63. Ripatti, supra note 61, at 9; Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Exchanges 3
(Council on Foreign Relations, Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation Paper,
July
2009),
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Squam_Lake_Working_
Paper5.pdf [hereinafter Squam Lake Working Paper] (“Once the swap is cleared, the original
counterparties are insulated from direct exposure to each other’s default, and rely instead on
the performance of the clearinghouse.”).

2011]

THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S SWAP EXEMPTIONS

1501

The answer lies in the fact that clearinghouses theoretically offer
efficiency gains and possess tools enabling them to limit potential losses.64
First, centralization of transaction processing and risk management offers
substantial efficiency gains. 65 “[H]igh-volume, developed markets,” such
as the United States, typically benefit from delegating these tasks to a
central, specialized institution.66 For example, “the internationalisation of
securities trading, the introduction of new electronic platforms and the
switch to order-driven anonymous trading systems in national stock
exchanges have made it increasingly impossible for trading parties to
control counterparty risk themselves.” 67 Thus, it may be inefficient, if not
impracticable, for individual firms to monitor the creditworthiness of each
Many believe that these informational
of their counterparties. 68
deficiencies had systemic consequences during the most recent financial
crisis: “Lack of transparency in the massive OTC market intensified
systemic fears during the crisis about interrelated derivatives exposures
from counterparty risk. These counterparty risk concerns played an
important role in freezing up credit markets around the failures of Bear
Stearns, AIG, and Lehman Brothers.” 69 A similar, although more
mundane, concern is that clearinghouses “generally offer straight-through
processing facilities aimed at reducing back-office bottlenecks” 70 that have
been observed at dealer firms. 71
Second, the ability to multilaterally net exposures by offsetting position
values (“netting”) is a primary benefit of clearinghouses. 72 Netting
essentially means that claims can be offset against liabilities, resulting in
one “net” liability. 73 Let us first consider the benefits of bilateral netting.
Assume that A owes B $50, and B owes A $100. If A defaulted on its
obligation to B, netting would allow B to offset this claim against its
liability to A, resulting in one net liability of $50. Therefore, B has limited
its loss in the event of the default. This device has been widely adopted by
OTC derivatives dealers. 74
64. See Ripatti, supra note 61, at 16 (“The primary force behind the creation of
[clearinghouses] is the economic interest of capital market participants in lowering the
market-side risks and costs of post-trade processing.”).
65. OTC Derivatives: Settlement Procedures and Counterparty Risk Management,
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 26 (1998), http://www.bis.org/publ/ecsc08.htm [hereinafter
Counterparty Risk Management].
66. Ripatti, supra note 61, at 13.
67. Id. at 17.
68. See id. at 19 (“This does not mean that [clearinghouses] eliminate counterparty
credit risk; they rather manage and redistribute it far more efficiently than market
participants could do in isolation.”).
69. S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 2, at 30 (2010).
70. See Ripatti, supra note 61, at 18.
71. See generally Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65 (discussing
deficiencies in the settlement and risk management processes of individual dealer firms).
72. Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note 63, at 3.
73. Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 37 (“In effect, multilateral netting
allows the clearing members to offset their net liabilities to some members against their net
claims on other members.”).
74. See id. at 2.
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The benefits of bilateral netting are limited to situations where claims are
against—and liabilities are owed to—the same party. Multilateral netting,
by contrast, allows for exposures to one party to be offset against exposures
to a different party. 75 To illustrate its advantages, consider the following
hypothetical from the Squam Lake Working Group on Financial
Regulation:
Suppose, to pick an ideal example, that Dealer A has an exposure on
credit derivatives to Dealer B of $ 1 billion, before considering collateral.
That is, if Dealer B fails, then A would lose $ 1 billion. Likewise, B has
an exposure to Dealer C of $ 1 billion, and C has an exposure to A of $ 1
billion. Without a clearinghouse, default by A, B, or C leads to a loss of $
1 billion. With clearing, however, the positive and negative exposures of
each counterparty cancel, and each poses no risk to anyone, including the
clearinghouse. 76

In other words, because the clearinghouse is a counterparty to all trades, it
can offset its claim against a defaulting clearing member with any amount
still owed to that clearing member. As a practical matter, this means that
the clearinghouse is fully repaid to the extent of that offset amount. Thus,
multilateral netting can result in fewer overall losses. 77
Additionally, the advantages of bilateral netting are “limited by systems
constraints, such as incomplete systems integration, that make it difficult
for dealers to calculate and administer net payments.” 78 Clearinghouses
could offer a solution to this problem by institutionalizing settlement
procedures and risk management. Just how effective can netting be? One
study found that bilateral netting provisions decreased total credit exposure
by 20 to 60 percent. 79 For reasons discussed above, one would expect these
benefits to be greater if netting occurred through a central clearinghouse.

75. Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note 63, at 3.
76. Id.
77. This raises important questions: how many clearinghouses should there be, and how
many different types of contracts should they clear? Commentators note that if there are
many clearinghouses clearing a limited number of contracts, then the benefits of multilateral
netting will be minimal. See Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 6; Squam
Lake Working Paper, supra note 63, at 4 (“[I]mportant opportunities to net offsetting credit
default swaps may be lost if clearing is scattered across several institutions.”). But see
Turbeville, supra note 48, at 14 (noting that if clearinghouses were also forced to clear
products with “unpredictable illiquidity and volatility” and management systems did not
work properly, then “the consequences could be even worse”). Thus, the optimal size of a
clearinghouse is itself a crucial question.
78. Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 2.
79. Id. at 2. However, the study proceeded to note the limits of bilateral netting as a risk
management device:
Despite the widespread use of bilateral netting, OTC derivatives have become a
significant source of credit exposures between the global financial institutions that are
the largest dealers. Consequently, if a major global financial institution were to fail,
losses to other dealers on OTC derivatives would be a potential channel for the
transmission of systemic disturbances.
Id. at 5. This report was written in 1998, one decade before these concerns were eventually
realized.
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An additional benefit of netting is that it can promote liquidity. Members
would only be required to post collateral on their net, as opposed to gross,
exposures. 80 The Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation
notes that as a result, “clearinghouses reduce . . . the demand for collateral,
a precious resource, especially during a financial crisis.” 81 In other words,
netting might be able to ease liquidity pressures by allowing for more
efficient use of collateral.
Third, some commentators have asserted that clearinghouses employ
methods and systems for managing counterparty risk that are superior to
those used by dealers. 82 To understand this assertion, it is necessary first to
explore the nature of counterparty risk in the swap market, and how the
tools used by clearinghouses manage those risks.
The practical consequence of a counterparty default is that a
clearinghouse must go out onto the market and purchase a replacement
contract. 83 In so doing, the clearinghouse stands to suffer a loss if the price
of the contract is now higher than the original purchase price.84 The risk of
this loss is referred to as “mark-to-market risk.” 85 Clearinghouses protect
against these losses by requiring members to post collateral, or “margin” in
clearing jargon. 86 In particular, a clearinghouse uses two different devices:
maintenance margins and initial margins. 87

80. See Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note 63, at 3.
81. Id.; see also Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 38 (noting that
multilateral netting of derivatives could promote liquidity); Turbeville, supra note 48, at 2
(“There are certain netting benefits that require less cash margin than bi-lateral transactions
that are subject to full collateralization of credit risks.”).
82. See, e.g., Turbeville, supra note 48, at 2 (“Clearinghouses manage credit risk using
proven methods and systems which are uniform and virtually always superior to that which
can be achieved by individual trading firms.”).
83. Id. at 1 (defining the credit risks in a derivatives trade as the risk that a replacement
contract will be more expensive). As previously discussed, the clearinghouse is legally
obligated to the non-defaulting party to perform the terms of the original contract. See supra
notes 63–65 and accompanying text. Thus, if one party defaults, they must purchase a
replacement so as to remain “balanced, with mirror image derivative transactions . . . at all
times.” Turbeville, supra note 48, at 10.
84. Id. at 5. This is because, unlike a real middleman who tries to sell his good at a
premium, the price at which the clearinghouse purchases the financial instrument is
(hopefully) the price at which it sells it. Thus, if the price of the replacement contract is
higher than the original price, the clearinghouse is experiencing a loss by having essentially
sold the contract at a discount.
85. Id. at 1.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 9; see also Credit Default Swaps and Counterparty Risk, EUR. CENT. BANK 52–
53
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/
creditdefaultswapsandcounterpartyrisk2009en.pdf. Clearinghouses also maintain a default
fund to protect against these losses, with members contributing funds based on their
transaction volume. However, these default funds are generally inadequate to cover the sorts
of systemic losses that occurred during the recent financial crisis. As an example, the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange maintains a default fund of about $2 billion. By contrast, the
average daily change in its risk is $3 billion (that is, the additional amount needed to cover
losses), and has at times reached in excess of $18.5 billion. Id.
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Maintenance margins are called as the price of the swap increases, thus
covering mark-to-market risk. Wallace C. Turbeville describes the
operation of maintenance margins as follows:
As the price associated with a derivative moves so as to create clearing
member credit risk to the clearinghouse, the amount of that risk has to be
funded by the clearing member. If the price subsequently moves in the
opposite direction, maintenance margin is reduced and the clearing
member receives a credit. A clearing member is very likely to have some
derivatives which move in its direction and some which move against it
during any calculation period. These movements are netted and the
required maintenance margin payment (or credit) is the netted amount. 88

Maintenance margins are typically calculated on a daily basis, although
intraday margins may be called if necessary. 89 So long as the deposited
margin could keep up with price changes, the clearinghouse would be fully
protected against any default, and it would experience no losses.90
However, this ideal situation is unlikely to occur. Maintenance margins
are most likely based on the previous day’s prices, which are unlikely to
have remained the same. 91 Moreover, markets may react adversely to the
member’s default, further affecting prices. 92 The risk that prices have risen
since the last call for maintenance margin is known as illiquidity/volatility
risk. 93 Clearinghouses protect against it by requiring that parties post initial
margin. 94 As one might have inferred, initial margin is the clearinghouse’s
estimate of price moves between the time when maintenance margin is
posted and when the contract could hypothetically be replaced.95 In the
end, because initial margin is calculated based upon historical data, the
ability of a clearinghouse to hedge this residual risk is dictated by the
accuracy of past observations in predicting future price changes.96
How does this system compare to that employed by dealers in the
bilateral, OTC market? In 1999, dealers with the most sophisticated
systems collateralized only 10 to 30 percent of derivatives transactions. 97 A
majority of those collateralization agreements provided for daily
recalculation of exposure and collateral values, but as a practical matter
“many call[ed] for collateral only weekly or monthly.”98 Although
practices changed significantly over the following decade, still only 63

88. Turbeville, supra note 48, at 9.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 8. This assumption is addressed at greater length in Part III.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 11.
97. Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 22.
98. Id. at 23. The report noted that collateral calls “add to [dealers’] legal and
operational risks.” Id. In other words, it was burdensome to make and process these calls,
and dealers were not always sure of the enforceability of terms providing for collateral calls,
particularly in foreign jurisdictions and where the counterparty had entered bankruptcy.
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percent of CDSs were collateralized by 2008. 99 It is perhaps for this reason
that the staunchest proponents of clearing have asserted that clearinghouses
will ensure capital adequacy if managed properly. 100 This contention is
revisited in Part III.
Finally, as evidenced by the legislative record, Congress believed that
cleared transactions would impose fewer external costs on the financial
system than if agreements were negotiated bilaterally. In its report in
support of the clearing mandate, the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Development noted that “[i]n the OTC market, margin
requirements are set bilaterally and do not take account of the counterparty
risk that each trade imposes on the rest of the system, thereby allowing
systemically important exposures to build up without sufficient capital to
mitigate associated risks.” 101 Viral Acharya and Alberto Bisin specifically
attribute this “counterparty risk externality” 102 to the opacity of the OTC
market, which leaves parties unable to properly price default risk without
adequate information regarding their counterparty’s other positions.103
Because a central clearing party records all of a party’s trades, they are
much better placed to price that risk, and require efficient levels of
collateral. 104
II. THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S
EXEMPTIONS FOR SWAPS
Thus far, this Comment has confined its inquiry to the basic uses of
swaps in the financial system, and the accompanying risks of counterparty
default. As noted above, those risks materialized during the recent financial
crisis to create massive losses and prompt a federal bailout. This part
introduces the following question: how, if at all, were these losses affected
by a change in the underlying bankruptcy rules to which swaps are subject?
To answer this question, it reviews scholarship showing how these rules
decreased incentives to monitor counterparty risk in the bilateral OTC
market, thereby increasing overexposure to weak, systemically important
institutions such as AIG.
This part begins by exploring three of the bedrock principles of the
Bankruptcy Code: the automatic stay, limits on preferential transfers, and
99. Wallison, supra note 3, at 7.
100. See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 47, at 105 (arguing that a “well capitalized and
federally supervised” clearinghouse would act as “protection against a lack of
creditworthiness of, and default by, OTC derivatives counterparties”).
101. S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 2, at 33 (2010); see also ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 53
(same).
102. Acharya and Bisin define this as “the effect that the default risk on one contract will
be increased if the counterparty agrees to the same contract with another agent because the
second contract increases the probability that the counterparty will be unable to perform on
the first one.” See Viral Acharya & Alberto Bisin, Counterparty Risk Externality:
Centralized Versus Over-the-Counter Markets 4 (June 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573355.
103. See generally id.
104. See id. at 5.
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the invalidation of ipso facto clauses. The purpose of this discussion is to
highlight the rules to which creditors are generally subject, so the reader can
get a sense of precisely how and to what extent swap exemptions confer a
privileged status. Next, it addresses the substance of the exemptions
themselves, with an emphasis on their practical significance for swap
participants. It then highlights some of the policy justifications for these
provisions. Finally, it shows how bankruptcy privileges promote financial
instability by reducing incentives to monitor counterparty risk.
A. The Bankruptcy Code’s Normal Provisions
Professor Thomas H. Jackson once wrote: “The basic problem that
bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a normative matter and as a
positive matter, is that the system of individual creditor remedies may be
bad for the creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go
around.” 105 To illustrate Professor Jackson’s insight, consider a world in
which no bankruptcy law existed. If debtors remained solvent, every
creditor would be paid in full. However, when a debtor had liabilities in
excess of assets, at least some creditors would by necessity experience
some loss. In such a regime, creditors would be paid on a first-come, firstserved basis. 106 As a result, creditors acting out of rational self-interest
would scramble to seize their share of the debtor’s limited assets before
nothing was left. 107
However, for a number of reasons, this process might not be desirable
from the perspective of creditors as a class. For example, the debtor’s
business might be worth more in one piece than the sum of its individual
assets. 108 If creditors liquidated the business piece by piece, they would not
be able to capture this additional value. Bankruptcy law is therefore a

105. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10 (1986). In
this sense, bankruptcy law seeks to solve a “tragedy of the commons,” with the debtor’s
estate being the common pool and individual creditors as the “users” of that resource. See id.
at 10–12.
106. See id. at 9.
107. Id. Professor Thomas H. Jackson analogizes this to concertgoers lining up to
purchase tickets: “the people first in line get the best seats; those at the end of the line may
get nothing at all.” Id.
108. This attribute is known technically as “the surplus of a going-concern value over a
liquidation value.” Id. at 14. Professors Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison
discuss this point further:
[Going-concern value] exists, however, only if the firm’s assets are worth more to
the firm than to outsiders. This asymmetry arises when assets are customized to
meet a firm’s idiosyncratic needs or the needs of firms in the same industry
(examples include airplanes, railroad tracks, and brewery equipment). These
specialized assets cannot be readily redeployed by other firms (if the assets are
firm-specific) or by firms outside the industry (if they are industry-specific). As a
result, plant, equipment, and other specialized assets are relatively illiquid: there
are few buyers for the assets, and any potential buyers will value the assets
significantly less than the seller does.
Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why
the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 111 (2005).
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collectivized debt collection system that imposes rules on creditors so as to
benefit this class in the aggregate.109
This section explores three of the Bankruptcy Code’s bedrock rules that
further this principal goal. In particular, it addresses the automatic stay,110
the avoidance of preferential transfers,111 and the invalidation of ipso facto
clauses. 112 However, as will be seen later in this Part, the Code exempts
creditors to swap agreements from each of these three rules. This privileges
them vis-à-vis the debtor’s other creditors, and likely causes them to
monitor counterparty risk less rigorously.
1. The Automatic Stay
The automatic stay, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362, acts as a “bar to all
judicial and extrajudicial collection efforts against the debtor or the debtor’s
property.” 113 It comes into effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. 114 This rule serves an important function for creditor protection.
As noted above, the debtor’s estate presents a common resource problem.
Allowing creditors to line up and dismember the debtor piece by piece
would in many situations be undesirable from the perspective of creditors as
a class. 115 The automatic stay directly prevents creditors from engaging in
this sort of conduct. 116
It is important to note that the automatic stay is also effective against
secured creditors. 117 In other words, once the debtor files for bankruptcy,
the automatic stay prevents the secured creditor from seizing its collateral.
One might ask: if secured creditors already have priority in certain assets of
the debtor—as swap participants do once their counterparties post
collateral 118—then why can they not promptly proceed against those assets
to satisfy their claims? The answer lies in the fact that the collateral,
although subject to a security interest, may be essential to the debtor’s
109. See JACKSON, supra note 105, at 14. Professor Jackson notes that preserving “the
aggregate value of the assets” is only the most “obvious reason” for a collectivized debt
collection system; there are other significant benefits as well. Id. For example, creditors may
prefer a guaranteed collection, even at a deficiency, rather than risk losing the race and
getting paid nothing at all. See id. at 15. Moreover, such races for the debtor’s assets can be
wasteful in and of themselves. See id. at 16.
110. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
111. See id. § 547(b).
112. See id. § 365(e)(1).
113. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 1548.
114. See § 362(a) (noting that the petition itself “operates as a stay”); 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.LH[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
115. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
116. The legislative history of the automatic stay confirms this as an underlying policy
justification: “Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies
against the debtor’s property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of their claims in
preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297.
117. § 362(a)(5) (stating that the stay is applicable to “any act to create, perfect, or
enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title”).
118. See Lubben, supra note 21, at 126.
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operations and thus its ability to reorganize. In other words, proceeding
against the collateral creates an externality: “Removal of collateral benefits
the secured creditor but harms other creditors by destroying firm value.”119
Absent the automatic stay, the secured creditor would ignore this external
cost and proceed against the collateral anyway. 120 Therefore, the automatic
stay as applied to secured creditors still benefits creditors as a class.
2. Avoidance of Preferential Transfers
Preferential transfers are payments made by an insolvent debtor to or for
the benefit of a creditor prior to bankruptcy, enabling that creditor to
receive more than it would have in the bankruptcy proceeding. 121 Section
547(b) of the Code gives the trustee in bankruptcy the power to avoid such
transfers. 122 Note that the provision makes no reference to the creditor’s or
debtor’s intent—only the transaction’s effect upon other creditors is
significant. 123
The effect of a preferential payment is, of course, to benefit one
particular creditor at the expense of the debtor’s other creditors. Professor
Jackson notes that, consequently, a preferential payment
would not be in the collective interest of the creditors because it
reintroduces the common pool problem. Preference law is best viewed as
a solution to this replication of the common pool problem that results
119. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 107.
120. See id. at 17–18. Professor Jackson and Professor Douglas G. Baird further
elaborate on this point:
Individual diverse owners have a particular incentive to act against the collective
interest in cases where, under nonbankruptcy law, some owners are entitled to be
paid before others and where the available assets are insufficient to satisfy all those
with rights to them. A fully secured creditor, for example, has the right to be paid
before more junior creditors receive anything. Like any other person assured of
full payment if the business were to stop, he will tend to favor an immediate
liquidation, even in circumstances in which a sole owner would keep the assets
together. As a senior debtholder he has nothing to gain from waiting and
attempting to keep the firm intact, but he can do worse if the firm continues and its
fortunes decline—a possibility that always exists in an uncertain world, whether
the firm is solvent or insolvent, in or out of bankruptcy.
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106–07 (1984).
121. § 547(b) defines as preferential
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property—
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed
by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was
insolvent; (4) made . . . on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition . . . (5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if—(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had
not been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
§ 547(b).
122. Id.
123. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 547.03; see also Kenan v. Fort Worth
Pipe Co., 792 F.2d 125, 127 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that the basis for exceptions to § 547(b)
is that such instances are not “deemed harmful to the debtor’s estate”).
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from strategic planning in the prebankruptcy period. Preference law,
therefore, is essentially a transitional rule designed to prevent individual
creditors from opting out of the collective proceeding once that event
becomes likely. It is part of the attempt to ameliorate the effects of a
common pool problem that justifies a collective proceeding in the first
place. 124

It is therefore necessary to keep bankruptcy a system of collectivized debt
collection. Without it, creditors would be able to get in line ahead of others,
leaving nothing for those late in the game.
3. Prohibition of Ipso Facto Clauses
An ipso facto clause stipulates the contractual effect of a party entering
into bankruptcy. 125 These clauses typically allow a party to terminate a
contract when its counterparty files for bankruptcy. 126 In re Clerc
Chemical Corp. 127 provides a classic example of an ipso facto clause, as
well as courts’ hesitancy to enforce such clauses even before the
Bankruptcy Code was enacted. In Clerc Chemical, Reilly Tar & Chemical
Corporation leased property to Frederick D. Loeb.128 The lease contained
an ipso facto clause, providing:
If the Lessee shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, file a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy, make a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, or if a
receiver of its properties and assets shall be appointed, then and in that
event the Lessor shall have the option to terminate this lease . . . . 129

Thereafter, Loeb assigned the lease to Clerc Chemical, a corporation he had
formed. 130 Two years later Clerc Chemical filed a bankruptcy petition, and
Reilly Tar & Chemical exercised its option to terminate the lease.131
Notwithstanding a clause that bound the assignee to the “terms,
covenants, conditions and agreements” of the original lease, and the fact the
assignee was the original lessee’s own corporation, the court held that the
ipso facto clause was not binding against Clerc Chemical. 132 The court
began by noting that “[f]orfeitures are not favored either at law or in
equity,” and that “a provision for a forfeiture in a lease will be construed
strictly in favor of the tenant.” 133 It then proceeded to base its holding on
the fact that there were no express words binding the assignee to the ipso
facto clause.
124. JACKSON, supra note 105, at 125.
125. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 905 (defining an ipso facto clause
as a “contract clause that specifies the consequences of a party’s bankruptcy”).
126. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 365.08[1].
127. 52 F. Supp. 109 (D.N.J. 1943).
128. See id. at 109.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 109–10.
133. Id. at 110 (quoting In re Larkey, 214 F. 867, 870 (D.N.J. 1914)). A forfeiture clause
is a “contractual provision stating that, under certain circumstances, one party must forfeit
something to the other.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 722.
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Clerc Chemical aptly demonstrates courts’ distaste for enforcing ipso
facto clauses because of their potential to cause forfeitures. Additionally,
courts failed to enforce these clauses “in order to allow the trustee to make
the most of any valuable asset in the estate.” 134 Although Clerc Chemical
did not explicitly invoke this latter justification, the facts of the case
illustrate the underlying policy: if Clerc Chemical was permitted to stay on
the property, they could have continued to do business and generated
revenue to satisfy creditors’ claims. With a forfeiture, it would have been
entirely deprived of this opportunity.
Prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, such clauses
were generally enforceable. 135 The Reform Act reversed this rule and
Stated simply, contractual
codified cases like Clerc Chemical. 136
provisions that provide for modification or termination of the contract in the
event of insolvency, 137 bankruptcy, 138 or the appointment of a receiver or
custodian 139 are void.
B. Provisions Exempting Derivatives
When the Bankruptcy Code was first enacted in 1978, it accorded special
status to a narrow class of financial transactions and actors. 140 Over the
next twenty-five years, Congress greatly expanded both the scope and
number of these exemptions from the Code’s ordinary provisions,
eventually reaching swap agreements. 141 As noted above, the automatic
stay, avoidance of preferential transfers, and the invalidation of ipso facto
clauses operate by limiting the enforceability of certain contractual
provisions when the debtor enters bankruptcy. The Code privileges swaps
by exempting them from these limitations on creditor conduct. 142 Stated
conversely, it accords these creditors much more freedom to contractually
protect themselves from a debtor’s insolvency. 143 Below is an overview of
134. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 365.08; see also Yates Dev., Inc. v.
Old Kings Interchange, Inc., 241 B.R. 247, 253 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“These termination
clauses are invalidated because they deprive the Chapter 11 estate of valuable property
rights, such as the opportunity to receive the benefits of a contract, at the very time the
debtor and the estate may need these rights the most in order to further rehabilitation
efforts.”).
135. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 365.08.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2006).
137. See § 365(e)(1)(A).
138. See § 365(e)(1)(B).
139. See § 365(e)(1)(C).
140. See 11 U.S.C. § 764(c) (Supp. II 1979).
141. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 96.
142. Roe, supra note 8, at 548 (“Bankruptcy sticklers may object to calling these priority
provisions and they are formally correct . . . . The derivatives and repo benefits operate by
exempting the bankrupt’s derivatives- and repo-holding creditors from baseline
rules . . . insulating them from typical creditor liability rules . . . and giving them more
rights.”).
143. See Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New
Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 645 (2005) (“These limits on counterparty rights, however,
do not apply when the underlying contract is a financial contract and the counterparty is a
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the relevant statutory provisions, and their significance for creditors. As
will be seen, swap privileges essentially fall into three categories: rights to
seize collateral, rights to setoff, and the avoidance of liability for
preferential transfers.
Almost all swap agreements provide that the commencement of a
bankruptcy proceeding constitutes an event of default, giving rise to certain
remedial rights. 144 Of these, the Code protects the rights to liquidate,
terminate, and accelerate the agreement, and the right to offset and net
claims. 145 Furthermore, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17) creates an exception to the
automatic stay for exercise of contractual rights arising out of security and
netting agreements. 146 Taken together, these provisions give parties to
swap agreements a material advantage over the debtor's other creditors in
the event of insolvency, increasing both the amount and timeliness of their
recovery.
To illustrate, consider first secured creditor rights. As discussed
previously in Part I.C, parties to swap agreements often make collateral
calls in an effort to secure their counterparty’s obligations, and that doing so
creates a secured claim. 147 Normally, the automatic stay would prevent a
secured creditor from foreclosing against its collateral once the debtor
enters bankruptcy. 148 Sections 560 and 362(17) are exceptions to this rule,
specifically providing that the rights of secured creditors to swap
agreements are unaffected by the filing of a petition.149 Because initiating a
bankruptcy proceeding almost always constitutes an event of default in a
swap agreement, the practical consequence is that the creditor can terminate
an unfavorable contract with the debtor and immediately seize the posted
collateral. 150
Collier on Bankruptcy describes the right to setoff as follows:
Setoff is a right of equitable origin designed to facilitate the adjustment of
mutual obligations. Its central premise is an ancient one well-grounded in
practical logic: If A is indebted to B, and B is likewise indebted to A, it

‘protected party.’ Protected parties enjoy the same rights in bankruptcy as they do outside.”
(emphasis added)); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 560.04[2] (noting
that termination and acceleration rights are furnished not by the Code itself, but by “a written
agreement or other document, such as a customer agreement, master agreement or the terms
and conditions printed on a confirmation of the transaction”).
144. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 560.04.
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 560 (2006); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114,
¶ 560.04 .
146. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17); see also id. § 362(b)(27) (giving similar privileges to “a
master netting agreement participant”); id. § 362(o) (providing that these rights may not be
stayed by “any order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this title.”).
Collier on Bankruptcy explains the inclusion of § 362(o) as follows: “This provision was
added by the 2005 Act to make clear that the protections afforded by section 362(b)(17) . . .
cannot be circumvented by an injunction issued pursuant to section 105(a).” 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 560.05 n.7.
147. See Lubben, supra note 21, at 126.
148. See generally supra Part II.A.
149. See §§ 362(b)(17), 560.
150. See Roe, supra note 8, at 548.
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makes sense simply to apply one debt in satisfaction of the other rather
than require A and B to satisfy their mutual liabilities separately. 151

Such is commonly used by swap participants to limit credit exposure in the
form of bilateral netting, as noted in Part I.C. These rights are important to
creditors for several reasons. First, setoff allows the creditor to avoid
handing money over to the debtor that it otherwise would. Second, setoff
effectively means that the creditor’s claim is secured by its own debt: the
creditor will be paid first out of the debtor’s claim on it, up to the amount of
that claim. 152 Thus, this priority enables it to recover more than the
debtor’s other creditors. 153
Finally, in addition to the setoff and secured creditor rights discussed
above, the Code also exempts parties to swap agreements from the
avoidance of preferential transfers. 154 Consequently, the creditor can keep
payments—and in particular, transfers of collateral—which the trustee
could have otherwise voided if made 90 days prior to the filing of a
petition. 155
C. Justifications for the Code’s Exemptions for Swaps
As Parts II.A–B have shown, the rules applicable to swaps deviate
substantially from the Bankruptcy Code’s normal provisions. These
exemptions privilege one class of creditors to the eventual detriment of
others. What justifications underlie such differential treatment? Congress
essentially had two motives: the prevention of the debtor unfairly “cherrypicking” favorable contracts, and the promotion of financial stability. Each
of these is discussed below. In addition, this section will address several
criticisms of this latter argument, and note an alternative justification which
has been proposed by scholars.
One of Congress’s concerns was that if a creditor could not terminate and
setoff multiple agreements, the debtor could unfairly choose which
executory contracts 156 to perform and which to terminate pursuant to its

151. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 553.01.
152. See id. ¶ 553.02 (“Indeed, a right of setoff has been described as ‘security of the
most perfect kind’ precisely because the creditor holds the means of satisfying its claim
through the extinguishment of its own debt.” (quoting Boston Ins. Co. v. Nogg, 362 F.2d
111, 114 (2d Cir. 1966))).
153. See id.
154. See § 546(g); see also § 546(j) (granting similar privileges to transfers made
pursuant to a master netting agreement). Constructively fraudulent transfers, otherwise
avoidable pursuant to § 548(a)(1)(B), are also exempted. See § 546(g). Thus, the only
payments not exempted are those made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, indebted.” See § 548(a)(1)(A).
155. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 546.08.
156. Executory contracts are those “under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and
the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.”
Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460
(1973).
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avoidance powers in § 365. 157 The specific inequity arises out of the fact
that the trustee could wait to see how the market performed before choosing
whether to accept or reject a contract. Collier on Bankruptcy explains the
concern that permitting the trustee to “play the markets with perfect
hindsight in determining whether to assume or reject swap agreements
seems to go far beyond the normal liquidation and reorganization policies
of the Bankruptcy Code, and arguably amounts to affording the estate a
windfall at the expense of other participants in the market.” 158
However, by far the most significant concern was thought to be the
promotion of stability in financial markets.159 Senator Grassley, when
arguing for extension of these privileges to swap agreements, summarized
the unifying purpose of these exemptions: “This amendment would go a
long way toward ensuring that the failure of a participant will not unduly
disrupt an extremely important financial market. The bill follows an
approach that . . . is to minimize risk and dislocation to financial markets
after a bankruptcy.” 160 But how exactly could these provisions promote
financial stability?
The House Report stated that “[t]he prompt liquidation of an insolvent’s
position is generally desirable to minimize the potentially massive losses
and chain reaction of insolvencies that could occur if the market were to
move sharply in the wrong direction.” 161 In the event of a large
institution’s bankruptcy, the automatic stay would render its counterparties’
157. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-484, at 3 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 223, 225
(“Concerns have been raised that under current bankruptcy law, termination and setoff of a
swap agreement would be automatically stayed when one of the parties files a bankruptcy
petition, whereupon the trustee, after indefinitely postponing termination of the swap
agreement, could refuse setoff and unfairly “cherry pick” only the portions of the agreement
advantageous to the debtor, while rejecting the portions unfavorable to the debtor.”).
158. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 118, ¶ 560.01 n.4.
159. In fact, Congress and many commentators believed that cherrypicking might by
itself destabilize the market. See 136 Cong. Rec. S7413, 7536 (June 6, 1990) (statement of
Sen. Grassley) (“[T]here is the risk that a defaulting party or a trustee in bankruptcy could
assume favorable swap transactions and reject unfavorable ones—so-called cherry picking—
even though the swap contract calls for liquidation of these obligations by netting. The
exposure created by these risks takes on special significance in a volatile market.”);
Morrison & Riegel, supra note 143, at 642 (“Losses from indefinite exposure to market
movements and from cherrypicking could produce financial distress in the counterparty
itself, forcing it to default on its own contracts with other parties. As one distressed party
infects another, a domino effect could ensue, undermining the entire financial market.”).
160. 136 Cong. Rec. at 7536. Senator Grassley noted in passing that swaps are a
particularly valuable financial instrument to thrift organizations, who were at the time
experiencing “severe financial pressure.” Id. Thus, one can gather that the Savings and Loan
Crisis (1986–95) was a motivating factor for passage of this legislation. Timothy Curry &
Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, FDIC
BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 26, 27, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/
banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf. The value of swaps to a thrift organization arises out of
the fact that it typically has assets with fixed rates of return (i.e. mortgages) and liabilities
with variable interest rates. See 136 Cong. Rec. at 7536. This makes it particularly
vulnerable to spikes in interest rates. See id. As noted above, interest rate swaps would
allow them to hedge against this risk by “swapping” their variable interest rate liabilities for
fixed rate liabilities.
161. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 585.
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claims illiquid, thus increasing the chance that they would themselves
become unable to meet liabilities. Allowing creditors to immediately seize
Moreover, a
collateral would theoretically solve this problem. 162
subsequent House Report clarified the need to protect this particular class of
creditors: “Because financial markets can change significantly in a matter
of days, or even hours, a non-bankrupt party to ongoing securities and other
financial transactions could face heavy losses unless the transactions are
[resolved] promptly and with finality.” 163 Thus, the reasoning was that
financial markets merited special treatment because of their highly volatile
nature.
Professors Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison point to a
number of deficiencies in these arguments. They note that swap
participants are no more likely to become insolvent than any of the debtor’s
other creditors. 164 Thus, Congress’s “volatility of financial markets”
reasoning is too broad to adequately explain why certain creditors are
privileged and others are not. They concede that a “chain of insolvencies”
might be possible if creditors had failed to properly manage risk vis-à-vis
the debtor. 165 But they respond that “the solution to this failure is better
risk management by counterparties, not amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code exempting derivatives counterparties from its automatic stay
provisions. Or . . . the answer should be either better supervision or a
regulatory structure that increases incentives to manage counterparty risk
more effectively.” 166 They also argue that these exemptions could
exacerbate the situation by causing effects akin to a bank run. 167 In the end,
they seem to suggest that, although ostensibly not misguided, these
provisions rest on tenuous justifications and should “worry” those members
of Congress who unwaveringly subscribe to the systemic risk argument. 168
D. The Potential for Exemptions to Magnify Losses
Despite Congress’s best intentions in enacting these exemptions, scholars
have noted a number of unintended effects.169 This Comment focuses on
Professor Mark J. Roe’s research showing that privileged status induces less
rigorous market discipline, thereby magnifying the scale of a financial
crisis. 170 Roe essentially argues that because of these privileges, swap
participants are less exposed to loss in the event of default. Consequently,
162. Cf. Morrison & Riegel, supra note 143, at 642 (“Without these safe harbors, markets
might suffer serious shocks—perhaps even a systemic liquidity crisis, causing markets to
collapse—when debtors enter bankruptcy. Counterparties to financial contracts would find
themselves subject to the automatic stay for extended periods. They would be unable to
liquidate volatile contracts and thereby limit their exposure to market movements.”).
163. H.R. REP. NO. 101-484, at 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 223, 224.
164. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 101–02.
165. See id. at 102–03.
166. Id. at 103.
167. See id. at 101.
168. See id. at 122.
169. See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 21; Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108.
170. See generally Roe, supra note 8.
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they have less incentive to rigorously monitor their counterparty’s
creditworthiness and take steps to protect themselves when they perceive
any increase in the risk of default.171 This in turn gives weak counterparties
access to inexpensive financing, increasing the magnitude of an eventual
failure.
How exactly do reduced incentives to monitor counterparty risk magnify
losses in a financial crisis? Roe argues that these privileges
induc[e] stronger players to accept a higher, perhaps imprudently higher,
level of derivatives and repo financing with weak counterparties. If they
bore more risk of counterparty failure, they might demand bettercapitalized counterparties. Or they would demand better counterparty
portfolio information, so that they could better price that risk. They
would charge the risky counterparty more and the sound one less. The
weak counterparty would be incentivized to become financially stronger
(so as to be charged less) and, at least to the extent prices rose, the parties
would do less derivatives and repo business. The Code’s superpriorities
thereby undermine market discipline. 172

Thus, the Code’s privileges result in the debtor’s and creditor’s 173 overuse
of these particular instruments, without sufficient capital backing. 174 This
overexposure would have been lessened if creditors were incentivized to
“contain the risk of counterparty failure.” 175 In the end, it was AIG, Bear
Stearns, and Lehman Brothers’ large exposures to instruments protected by
the Code, and lack of necessary capital reserves, which precipitated their
collapses. 176
Morrison and Edwards find a related effect on firms’ incentive structure.
They argue that, because derivatives can be used as a proxy for a loan, these
exemptions may incentivize creditors to shift toward using swaps instead of
loans as a financing device. This would occur when the debtor’s
creditworthiness declines, because the benefits of priority status start to
outweigh the increased transaction costs. 177 Morrison and Edwards note
that this shift is simply a form of rent-seeking—the act of increasing profits

171. Id. at 555.
172. Id.
173. Creditors could face insolvency if their exposure is so high that there is not enough
collateral to cover their losses in the event of a default. This would have been precisely the
case if the federal government had not stepped in to bail out AIG. See Wallison, supra note
3, at 7.
174. See Roe, supra note 8, at 555.
175. Id.
176. See generally id. at 550–54.
177. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 120.
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without actually producing any additional wealth178: creditors with these
privileges recover more, leaving less for those who must wait their turn. 179
Both Roe and Morrison and Edwards note that these parties do better in
the event of counterparty insolvency, and both address different effects of
this increased recovery on incentives. Roe focuses primarily on how swap
privileges cause slackened efforts to contain counterparty risk, because
creditors are essentially concerned with collateral rather than firm value.
By contrast, Edwards and Morrison posit that increased riskiness can itself
induce greater reliance on derivatives. Taken together, the two arguments
suggest that a self-perpetuating process occurs whereby derivatives induce
more precarious positions, and these more precarious positions in turn mean
that creditors prefer to deal with the debtor only when protected by the
Code’s privileges. 180 Perhaps this theory could help to explain the
exponential rise of derivatives in recent years, as well as some of the more
outrageous positions taken prior to the crisis. 181
Before continuing, it is worth noting one of the counterarguments to
Roe’s position. Because the debtor’s other creditors are subject to the
normal rules of bankruptcy, they recover less as a result of these privileges.
Therefore, they should more diligently monitor that counterparty risk and
contain losses in the event of default. 182 In particular, they should increase
the cost of credit, or refuse to lend unless their counterparty acquired a
sounder capital structure. 183 Both of these measures would make the
financial system more stable. 184 However, these third parties lack either the
incentives or the capacity to do so. 185 Consequently, the Code’s
exemptions give priority to those best positioned to monitor counterparty
risk.
Notwithstanding the potential destabilizing effects of the Code’s
exemptions for derivatives contracts, these exemptions are not addressed in
178. Gordon Tullock, The Fundamentals of Rent-Seeking, 1 LOCKE LUMINARY NO. 2
(1998), available at http://www.thelockeinstitute.org/journals/luminary_v1_n2_p2.html
(noting that, from an efficiency perspective, the essential problem with rent-seeking is that
the resources entities expend in seeking such rents constitutes waste). The Economist
describes rent-seeking in more accessible terms: “Cutting yourself a bigger slice of the cake
rather
than
making
the
cake
bigger.”
Economics
A-Z,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/r#node-21529810 (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
179. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 121. Professors Morrison and Edwards
further note that exemptions may eventually “alter the debt structure of firms towards a
greater reliance on derivatives by favoring derivatives counterparties over other creditors.”
Id.
180. Roe also notes this potential for a “self-reinforcing engine” to occur. Roe, supra
note 8, at 559.
181. See id. at 556. For an example of one such transaction, see infra note 200.
182. See Roe, supra note 8, at 556.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 555.
185. See id. Roe analyzed the risk-monitoring capabilities of four creditor categories:
commercial paper holders, insurance premium payers, depositors, and the United States
government, who becomes a creditor in the event of a bailout. See id. at 557–59. He
concluded that none of these creditors are particularly capable of demanding sounder
counter-parties ex ante.
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Dodd-Frank, nor have they garnered much attention amongst reformers
more generally. Moreover, although investors may now be acutely aware
of derivatives’ riskiness, the exemptions still constitute remaining structural
flaws in the ways those risks are assessed. Thus, it is of the utmost
importance that actions be taken to address the unintended effects of the
Code’s privileged status provisions, whether by outright repeal or
otherwise.
At the end of his article, Roe briefly addresses the potential impact of the
clearing mandate.186 Specifically, he states that “it’s unclear whether the
exchange would itself be properly incentivized to handle counterparty
risk.” 187 Part III addresses precisely this issue. This is a particularly
relevant inquiry because, with the passage of Dodd-Frank, there is no
longer the same political expediency so necessary to effectuate financial
reform. 188 Thus, the clearing mandate may be the best opportunity to
bolster market discipline, and prevent another crisis event.
III. THE POTENTIAL FOR DODD-FRANK’S CLEARINGHOUSE MANDATE
TO RESTORE STABILITY TO THE SWAP MARKET
The questions addressed by this part include whether the clearinghouse
structure could provide greater incentives to monitor counterparty risk, and
if so, what regulatory controls might be necessary to ensure that limits on
losses are in fact put into place. These inquiries are essential because, as
argued below, clearinghouses’ traditional risk management tools are not
likely to prevent a systemic event. Thus, clearinghouses are in danger of
falling victim to the same unintended effects of the Bankruptcy Code that
magnified losses in the recent financial crisis. Nonetheless, this part argues
that a clearinghouse would theoretically have greater incentives to monitor
counterparty risk. Finally, it addresses some of the steps regulators should
take to ensure that clearinghouses are exercising greater market discipline.
A. Traditional Clearinghouse Risk Management Devices Are Not Likely
Capable of Preventing Another Systemic Event
A clearinghouse’s primary risk management devices likely would not
have prevented the systemic losses experienced during the recent financial
crisis. The purpose of margining is to ensure an amount of collateral is
called sufficient to cover any losses from replacement of the contract on the
open market. 189 Stated simply, so long as margining can keep up with the
costs of replacing the trade, then the clearinghouse is adequately protected
186. See Roe, supra note 8, at 586–87.
187. Id.
188. The absence of a political constituency for reform owes to the fact that policymakers
suffer from powerful reputational disincentives to enact regulatory reforms. Consequently,
they will only do so if continued regulatory forbearance is so ostensibly misguided as to
harm their political careers. See EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS: HOW DID
IT HAPPEN? 68 (1989) (documenting this phenomenon in the context of the Savings and
Loan Crisis).
189. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
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from any losses arising out of counterparty default. If it does not, then the
clearinghouse itself faces insolvency.
It seems unlikely that a clearinghouse would be able to make adequate
collateral calls if it were highly exposed to a systemically important
institution. Consider the extraordinary speed and volume of collateral calls
made against AIG during the recent financial crisis:

190

AIG simply had insufficient capital reserves to meet collateral calls on its
CDS positions as they rapidly came due. Conceptually, this means that
AIG was unable to post the amount of collateral which its counterparties
deemed necessary to protect themselves from its default. The simple
feature of trades being executed through a centralized clearing party, rather
than bilaterally, does not alter this fundamental problem of capital
inadequacy. True, a clearinghouse’s collateral calls would have been more
systematic and thorough, but that does not change the fact that deals are
largely collateralized as the market worsens, not ex ante. Moreover, a
clearinghouse’s use of initial margins is unlikely to have made much of a
difference either: it seems entirely unrealistic that it could accurately
190. See Paul Kiel, AIG’s Spiral Downward: A Timeline, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2008),
http://www.propublica.org/article/article-aigs-downward-spiral-1114.
A similar trend
occurred in CDS spreads. See, e.g., Hayne Leland, Structural Models and the Credit Crisis
(July 8, 2009), http://haas.berkeley.edu/groups/finance/CHINA7.pdf. Thus to the extent that
a clearinghouse would have based its collateral calls on mark-to-market risk instead of credit
rating downgrades, AIG still would have been unlikely to meet those collateral calls.

2011]

THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S SWAP EXEMPTIONS

1519

predict the amount of collateral it would need to replace agreements during
a crisis event. In other words, the illiquidity/volatility risk on which initial
margins are based would be too difficult to calculate. Thus, if a
clearinghouse was already overexposed to a systemically important
institution, it is highly unlikely that its system of margining could have
adequately protected it from default.
One might argue that multilateral netting would simultaneously limit
credit exposure and drastically reduce the need for collateral. This would
soften the blow of a counterparty’s failure on the clearinghouse and its
members. To illustrate, they might point to the fact that during Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy proceedings, its counterparties presented $400 billion
in CDSs for settlement, but after netting, only $6 billion actually “changed
hands.” 191 Although this argument seems powerful, the actual value of
multilateral netting is highly uncertain.192 In particular, commentators note
that a large number of clearinghouses could substantially dampen its
benefits. 193
What about the contention that clearinghouses would have prevented the
problem of overexposure ex ante by requiring higher initial margin? In its
defense of the clearing mandate, the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs cited the IMF for the proposition that “[p]utting
nearly all derivatives through clearinghouses, with tough margin rules,
could do away with most of the under-collateralization.” 194 Given the
extraordinary shortage of collateral experienced during the recent financial
crisis, this contention seems appealing.
However, it dodges the
fundamental issue of whether a clearinghouse is better incentivized to hedge
against counterparty risk. After all, tougher collateral requirements in the
bilateral market, induced by rigorous market discipline, also could have
solved the under-collateralization problem.
This concern over incentives is far from academic. Some have warned
that the market for clearing might become too competitive, with
clearinghouses consequently lowering membership eligibility standards in
order to capture greater market share. Wallace C. Turbeville notes that
“[c]ompetition among clearinghouses is intense. Their revenues are driven
by volume of contracts cleared. There is a strong incentive to exceed the
boundaries of prudent risk management in order to succeed against the
competitors.” 195 Thus, clearinghouses might eschew higher collateral
191. ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 53. In addition, clearinghouse failures have proven
themselves to be very rare occurrences. See Ripatti, supra note 61, at 16–20. Recent
examples include the Caisse de Liquidation in 1973, the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing
House in 1983, and the Hong Kong Futures Guarantee Corporation in 1987. Id. at 24. This
may not be much comfort, though, given that the recent financial crisis could itself be
described as an extraordinary event.
192. See Mark Roe, Derivatives Clearinghouses Are No Magic Bullet, WALL ST. J., May
6, 2010, at A19.
193. See, e.g., Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note 63, at 4.
194. S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 2, at 31 (2010).
195. Turbeville, supra note 48, at 12; see also Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note
63, at 3–4 (“In the fight for market share, they may compete by lowering their operating
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requirements in pursuit of greater revenue, just like participants in the
bilateral market. The crucial question is precisely why we should entrust
clearinghouses, instead of the bilateral market, with the decision-making
power over collateralization; it is too tenuous to assert categorically that
clearinghouses would have required more collateral a priori.
B. Because a Clearinghouse Would Bear More Risk of Default, It Would
Be Better Incentivized to Monitor Counterparty Risk
As the above analysis shows, there is strong reason to doubt that a
clearinghouse’s risk management tools would adequately limit its own
losses during a systemic event, at least of the type experienced in 2008.
Thus, the essential problem explored in Part II.D, and as articulated by Roe,
remains: the Code reduces incentives to monitor counterparty risk by
privileging this class of creditors. The only difference is that it is now a
clearinghouse, rather than its individual member firms, which might fail to
limit losses of counterparty default ex ante as a result of privileged status.
But are there reasons to believe that a clearinghouse might actually be more
incentivized to do so?
Theoretically, yes. There are several possible reasons. The first relates
to the fact that a clearinghouse would bear greater losses from a
counterparty’s default.196 Without a clearinghouse, risks are spread across
different firms, who have presumably diversified against them to some
degree. Moreover, the possibility of uncollateralized losses may appear too
remote to merit much attention, especially where that counterparty has a
high credit rating, and the prevailing market attitude at the time is one of
optimism.
However, as noted in Part I.C., a clearing structure essentially
concentrates counterparty risk in the clearinghouse. As a result, it would
bear greater losses in the event of a large institution’s default, and more
importantly, those losses would appear less remote: it would not be
diversified (especially where it was only clearing a limited class of
derivatives), and presumably its monitoring activities would be much more
focused on a particular class of instruments. 197 In other words, because
clearinghouses bear greater losses from default, it appears quite plausible
that the clearing structure would reduce the external risks that transactions
impose on the financial system. Consequently, the clearinghouse would be
better incentivized to price risk accurately.

standards, demanding less collateral from their customers, and requiring less capital from
their members.”).
196. The countervailing concern is that, in this way, the clearing mandate actually creates
institutions that are too big to fail. See Roe, supra note 192.
197. But see S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 11, at 241 (2010) (suggesting that “specialized
dealers in bilateral markets can monitor and manage the risks of complex, illiquid derivatives
contracts and complex, opaque counterparties more effectively than all-purpose
clearinghouses that are designed to clear standardized liquid contracts among clearing
members”).
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Second, bankruptcy privileges have provided so great a sense of security
that firms entirely ignored the potential for collateral calls to bring down
counterparties with large, correlated derivatives positions. Although one
might instead attribute this “rational ignorance” to the highly opaque nature
of the OTC market, 198 one could just as easily argue that this observed lack
of transparency was itself caused, at least in part, by the Code’s
exemptions: as Roe notes, if parties had borne more risk, they would have
demanded more information about their counterparties’ holdings. 199 At the
very least, it seems as if the Code’s privileges combined with the highly
opaque nature of the OTC derivatives market to leave parties completely
blinded to the actual risk of loss from a counterparty’s default. Perhaps this
could explain the logic behind some of the more baffling positions, such as
where VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Limited issued $20 million
in CDO protection to Wachovia and Citibank, or in other words, 40 percent
of the fund’s capital on these two contracts alone. 200
Regardless of its causes, this sense of security would have been entirely
irrational for a clearinghouse. Because of its system of margining, one
large swing in the market could result in crippling liability for its
counterparty on the mark-to-market risk of its swap portfolio. 201 In other
words, the clearinghouse would know that its own margining might destroy
such a thinly capitalized and undiversified firm.
Third, an individual firm may very well recognize the risk that its
counterparty is too thinly capitalized to meet all of its collateral calls.
However, the firm might also believe that it could contractually protect
itself from being too late in line. As previously noted, the swap
participant’s game is essentially to call for collateral before the counterparty
defaults. 202 If they do so, then they can foreclose against that collateral
once the debtor files for bankruptcy and apply the funds towards the
purchase of a replacement contract. Individual firms may believe that their
bankruptcy exemptions are sufficient to minimize counterparty risk, so long
as they “jump in line” in front of the debtor’s other privileged creditors,
thus fully collateralizing their losses. For example, they could try to do so
by demanding collateral earlier, or by including a broader range of
triggering events for collateral calls in the swap agreement. This view
might appear particularly sensible where other firms are generally not
diligent in making collateral calls, as was indeed the case before the
crisis. 203

198. See id. at 30 (“Had information been more readily available to regulators and
counterparties about the scope of AIGFP’s credit default swap positions, regulators and
market participants might have detected the systemic implications of AIGFP’s book.”).
199. Roe, supra note 8, at 555.
200. See Kevin LaCroix, Credit Default Swaps: The Newest Subprime Litigation Front,
D&O DIARY (Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/03/articles/subprimelitigation/credit-default-swaps-the-newest-subprime-litigation-front/.
201. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, a clearinghouse could not believe that it would win a race to
be first in margining. This is because a shift toward clearing would subject
all cleared trades to mandatory, systematic collateral calls. Although a
clearinghouse margins daily, and if necessary, intraday, it seems hard to
imagine that it would want to invest costly resources in securing an early
place in line. The more sensible solution is to limit the risk of losses from
counterparty default ex ante.
If clearinghouses do have greater incentives to limit counterparty risk,
then how could they go about doing so? Dodd-Frank expressly requires the
imposition of membership eligibility standards. 204 Under this statutory
authority, clearinghouses could require members to maintain capital
adequacy for its swap positions. If this were too costly, then members
would simply use fewer derivatives. Thus, these membership requirements
could directly address the issue at hand: limiting losses arising out of
counterparty default ex ante.
In order for clearinghouses to set membership requirements accurately,
there must be rigorous disclosure of a firm’s aggregate swap positions.
Otherwise a firm could spread a large, undiversified swap position across
many different clearinghouses, and create the illusion of financial health.
As noted above, this was one of the major problems in the bilateral OTC
market prior to the crisis. 205 Without adequate disclosure, transactions
between a clearinghouse and its members might create the same risk
externalities that were observed prior to the recent financial crisis.
One of the most salient reasons for doubting that clearinghouses will
have a different set of incentives is that virtually all of the key players in the
derivatives market prior to the financial crisis have recently entered the
clearing business. 206 If this is the case, one might wonder: why would
these firms have any different incentives as central clearing parties than as
dealers in the OTC market? 207 A related concern is the potential influence
of a clearinghouse’s members over management, a scenario the Department
of Justice likened to the “three or five largest airlines controlling all landing
rights at every U.S. airport.” 208 This could result in a push for lower
margin requirements and more lax eligibility standards, which would
entirely undermine the potential for the clearinghouse to contain
counterparty risk ex ante.
204. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 725(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1688 (2010).
205. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
206. See Mike Taylor, Bank of America Gets Into the Derivatives Clearing Business,
N.Y. OBSERVER (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.observer.com/2010/wall-street/bank-americagets-derivatives-clearing-business (noting that Bank of America, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank,
JP Morgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs have all entered the derivatives clearing business).
207. As of 2010, “[t]he largest fourteen derivatives dealers . . . [hold] 82 percent of
interest rate derivatives, 90 percent of credit default swaps, and 86 percent of equity
derivatives.” David Mengle, Concentration of OTC Derivatives Among Major Dealers,
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N (2010), http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/
ConcentrationRN_4-10.pdf.
208. Ben Protess, Justice Department Seeks Tougher Derivatives Rules, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Dec. 30, 2010, 12:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/justicetells-regulators-to-beef-up-derivatives-rules/; see also Turbeville, supra note 48, at 12–13.
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Regulators should be acutely aware of this tendency, and promulgate
robust prophylactic rules insuring that each clearinghouse’s board is not
conflicted with respect to managing the clearinghouse’s financial health. In
response to these concerns, and pursuant to requirements of Dodd-Frank,
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission has proposed rules that
would limit members’ ownership stakes and require boards to be composed
of outside directors. 209 The Securities and Exchange Commission is
currently seeking comments on similar proposed rules. 210 Commentators
have proposed additional governance requirements as well. For example,
Wallace C. Turbeville has advocated that
[a]t a minimum, the public’s interest should be represented by
membership on the risk committees of major clearinghouses. Regulatory
representation, or representation by other public interest organization,
would legitimize the process as long as resources and expertise were
provided to challenge decisions such as which derivatives are cleared and
which are not. 211

Of course, only experience will demonstrate which measures are sufficient.
Additional regulations might be needed if clearinghouses are not proving
independent enough to manage counterparty risk prudently.
CONCLUSION
Swaps are highly useful financial instruments which have been
developed to hedge against a broad spectrum of business risks, from credit
to currency, interest rate to commodity price volatility. When used
appropriately, they allow institutions to manage those risks more efficiently,
creating overall wealth gains. The explosion in their use should come as no
surprise.
However, the recent financial crisis has caused market participants to
seriously reevaluate the proper role of these instruments in the economy.
Similarly, policymakers should reexamine the various legal reforms which
were enacted to facilitate their widespread use. In particular, recent
scholarship has shown that the original justifications for the Bankruptcy
Code’s exemptions for derivatives may be misplaced. 212 If anything, these
exemptions likely facilitated the very crisis event that they were enacted to
prevent by reducing incentives to monitor counterparty risk.
Fortunately, provisions of Dodd-Frank may present an important
opportunity to strengthen market discipline. The purpose of this Comment
is to show which aspects of clearinghouses might be able to mitigate these
unintended effects of the Code’s swap exemptions, and which most likely
will not. Moreover, it highlights some of the key issues that regulators
should focus on to ensure that clearinghouses are better incentivized to
209. Turbeville, supra note 48, at 13.
210. See SEC Proposes Voting Caps for Derivatives Clearing, FINANCIAL NEWS (Oct. 14,
2010), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-10-14/sec-clearing-caps.
211. See Turbeville, supra note 48, at 13.
212. See supra notes 164–68, 169–80 and accompanying text.
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prevent the next AIG-type failure. In particular, regulators should mandate
standards regarding disclosure of aggregate swap positions to
clearinghouses, and promulgate strict governance rules designed to preserve
the board’s independence from its members.
This feature of clearinghouses should not chill debate over the continuing
prudence of the Bankruptcy Code’s swap exemptions. On the contrary, this
priority status constitutes a remaining structural flaw in the way market
participants assess counterparty risk. Moreover, this Comment has
attempted to show that much of the enthusiasm for the clearing mandate
may be considerably premature. But if the coming years demonstrate that
there is no political constituency for directly addressing these issues,
clearinghouses just may be our financial system’s greatest hope for
restoring stability to the swap markets.

